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The tendency of the day towards consolidation and combina-
tion resulting in the large corporations employing thousands of
servants, makes some better rule necessary defining who are
fellow-servants. The general rule is that "where a master.has
used due diligence in the selection of competent and trusty ser-
vants, and furnishes them with suitable means to perform the
service in which he employs them, he is not answerable to one of
them for an injury received by him in consequence of the careless-
ness of another, while both are engaged in the same service."
An employee impliedly contracts to assume all the ordinary risks
of the business he is engaged in and it is said that on grounds of
public policy these should include the risk of injury resulting
from the negligence of other servants in the same employment.
The reason of this rule is that they are engaged in a common
enterprise in which the safety of each depends 'much on the care
and skill with which each performs his appropriate duty. They
may observe the conduct of each other, give notice of any miscon-
duct, incapacity or neglect of duty, and leave the service if the
common employer neglects to take such precautions as the safety
of the whole may require. But in the case of all of our large
corporations, such as railroads, it will be seen that in many cases
the reason of the rule fails; for although the men may be said to
be in the same employment or service, yet their duties do not
bring them habitually together' so that they can exercise any of
the mutual influence on each other, which is the reason of the
rule. And, further, whenever injuries result to one servant from
the negligence of another employed by the same master, but the
opportunities for such mutual influence do not exist, it is hard to
see why the servant should not be allowed to recover on the
principle indicated in the maxim, respondeat superior. This view
has been taken by the Supreme Court of Kentucky, in the recent
case of The Louisville &- Nashville Railroad Co. v. Raines, Z3 S; W.
Rep. 5o5, in which it was held that a locomotive engineer could
recover for injuries received in a collision with another train of
the same company, caused by the negligence of the men in charge
of the other train. After stating the general rule, the court says:
" When one employer has employees engaged in different depart-
ments of the same service, and the service in each department is
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distinct and separate from that of the other, and neither
controlled by the other, but by its own employees, as in
the case of service of different railroad trains, operated by
the same company, then the rule is different, and the employees
belonging to each train and rendering service thereon are
not fellow-servants with the employees of the other train in
the sense that the one is the agent of the other, and assumes the
ordinary risks in reference to the manner that the employees on
the other train discharge their duty. In such case the employ-
ment in several, and the employees of each train occupy such
-position in the service with reference to the employees of the
other train as precludes their having any control over their
actions, or right to advise, even, as to the manner in which the
service is to be performed," and "the reason for releasing the
company from responsibility ceases to exist, and in such case those
controlling and directing the movements of the train with refer-
ence to those on another train must be regarded as the agents of
the company."
The legislative body of Massachusetts, acting under the right
conferred upon it by the State Constitution of presenting to the
justices of the Supreme Court any contemplated act to be passed
on as to constitutionality, submitted the three following questions:
"1First, Is it constitutional, in an act granting to women the right
to vote in town and city elections, to provide that such act shall
take effect throughout the commonwealth upon its acceptance by
a majority vote of the voters of the conmonwealth? Second, Is it
constitutional to provide in such an act that it shall take effect in
a city or town upon its acceptance by a majority vote of the
voters of such city or town? Third, Is it constitutional, in an act
granting to women the right to vote in town and city elections, to
provide that such an act shall take effect throughout the common-
wealth upon its acceptance by a majority vote of the voters of the
commonwealth, including women specially authorized to register
and vote on this question alone?" The court is peculiarly
divided in its opinion; four justices hold that all three are prop-
erly answered in the negative, two dissent and answer affirma-
tively, and one agrees with the majority as to the first and third,
and with the minority as to the second. Except in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Holmes, the constitutionality of an act passed
by the legislature conferring on women the right of suffrage in
city and town elections is not discussed. The constitutionality of
such a law is assumed, and the questions are considered on this
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assumption. Justice Holmes, however, disposes of that question
first, declaring that he has no doubt that the legislature has power
to pass such a law. In the majority opinion, those parts of the
constitution of Massachusetts relating to the first question are
treated in the light of the opinions of its founders and of the con-
stitutions of the others of the original thirteen States. A pure
democratic form of government was not established. The char-
acteristic feature of these constitutions was that they established
a government of representatives, and not of the people. After
they had created the legislature, the people reserved to themselves
no right to an appeal from any legislative, executive or judicial
act. "They apparently relied upon frequent elections, when the
officers were elected; upon the right of meeting and consulting
upon a common good; upon the right of petition and of instructing
-their representatives; upon impeachment, and upon the right of
reforming, altering and totally changing the form of government,
when the protection, safety, prosperity and happiness of the peo-
ple required it. Apparently, it was thought that the persons
selected for the executive, legislative and judicial officers in the
manner prescribed in the constitution would be men of good
,character and intelligence, of some experience in affairs and of
some independence of judgment, and would have a better oppor-
tunity of obtaining information, taking part in discussion and
carefully considering conflicting opinions than the people them-
selves, and the people, therefore, put the responsibility of carry-
ing on the government upon their representatives." Legislative
power can not be delegated to any other body or authority, and
the people have not retained this power unless it is so expressly
provided. While it is true that a general law can be passed. to
take effect upon the happening of a subsequent event, the weight
of opinion is that this event can not be the-adoption of the law by
the vote of the people. By so doing, "the substance of the trans-
action is that the legislature declines to take the responsibility of
passing the law; but the law has force, if at all, in consequence of
the votes of the people; they. are ultimately the legislators." The
amendments to the constitution regulating the incorporation of
cities and towns indicate no intention of having laws submitted to
the people for rejection or adoption, although the consent of the
inhabitants of cities and towns is necessary before the legislature
can incorporate them or change their constitutions. The first
question being thus disposed of, the second is considered.
"1There have been laws from the earliest times which delegated
legislative powers to the inhabitants of the towns, or permitted
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legislative powers to be exercised by such inhabitants over sub-
jects which were declared proper for municipal control." Exam-
ples given are c6ses where the union of two municipalities is made
conditional on acceptance by vote of the inhabitants, and the local
option laws, both of which have been held constitutional. But
the distinction between these and the present case rests here, that
an act granting the right of suffrage to women in town and city
elections IIrelates solely to the persons who should be invested
with a share of political power. Whether women should be per-
mitted to vote in town and city elections seems to us a matter of
general and not of local concern." It is not a matter of prolice reg-
ulation. In none of the States where the right of suffrage has
been confered on women, has the principle of local option been
applied. For similar reasons, the third question is also answered
in the negative. Justice Holmes, stating that where extrajudicial
opinions are asked, questions like the present are addressed to the
court as individuals, and require an individual answer, dissents.
The discretion of the legislature is intended to be exercised, but
"I think so much confidence is put in it that it is allowed to exer-
cise its discretion by taking the opinion of its principal, if it thinks
that course to be wise." The surrender of the sovereignty by the
people is not final. In regard to the second question, there are as
many objections to a local option with regard to liquor laws as
there would be with regard to women suffrage. Justice Barker
concurs with Justice Holmes, while Justice Knowlton is of the
opinion that the first and third questions should be answered in
the negative and the second in the affirmative.
